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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

MAX W. YOUNG, et. al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

)
)

vs.

)

WYCOFF COMPANY, INC., et. al.,

)

Defendants and Respondents.

CASE NO. 14488

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-Appellants, MAX W. YOUNG, AUDREY L. YOUNG,
and ROGER CLARK YOUNG [YOUNG] are all minority shareholders
in the four (4) defendant companies and commenced this
action against WYCOFF COMPANY, INC. [COMPANY]; WYCOFF
WAREHOUSE, INC. [WAREHOUSE]; WYCOFF CORPORATION [CORPORATION]; MOUNTAIN SERVICE, INC. [MOUNTAIN SERVICE]; and ZIONS
FIRST NATIONAL BANK [ZIONS], as Executor of the estate of
M. S. Wycoff, deceased, and as Trustee under the Last Will
and Testament of Milton Stanley "Slim" Wycoff, seeking
relief on two separate claims. The first claim sought
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(1) an order directing defendant Zions to transfer certain
securities to the other defendants as required by an agreement
of April 26, 1965 among Max W. Young, M. S. Wycoff and
others, (2) an accounting by defendant Zions with respect to
its dividend, distribution and debt relationships with the
other defendants, (3) the appointment of a receiver for
defendants Company, Warehouse, Corporation, and Mountain
Service, and (4) judgment that defendants Company, Warehouse,
Corporation and Mountain Service be dissolved, wound up and
their assets distributed.

The second claim sought judgment

against the defendants because of their wrongful discharge
and removal of plaintiff Max Young from the management and
board of directors of the defendant Wycoff corporations, and
damages in the amount of $120,000 by way of lost compensation.
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable James S. Sawaya,
District Judge, who entered Judgment on January 26, 1976, in
favor of defendants and against plaintiffs, no cause of
action, on all claims: and awarded defendants their costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
:. Plaintiffs-Appellants seek reversal of the judgment of
the District Court, entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs
on both claims, and such other relief as this court deems
proper.

-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The four defendant companies other than Zions collectively hereinafter referred to as the "Wycoff Companies",
are all.closely held Utah corporations engaged in the trucking,
transportation and warehousing business.

Company operates a

trucking business in Utah and portions of Idaho and Colorado
providing handling of specialty items such as film and mail*
Mountain Service owns trucks and equipment which it leases
principally to Company,
and three warehouses.

Warehouse owns an office building

Corporation owns four warehouses and

also owns, and leases to Company, a shop building, dock,
garage and terminal area.

The Wycoff Companies have inter-

related business operations and have common members on their
respective boards of directors.
Appellants own approximately twenty-five percent of the
outstanding voting stock in defendants Company, Warehouse,
and Corporation.

Mountain Service is wholly owned and

controlled (99.99%) by Company.

Legal title to and the

right to vote the controlling majority stock of Company,
Warehouse, and Corporation is held, and at all times material
hereto, was held, by defendant Zions as executor of the
estate of M. S. Wycoff and trustee under the last will and
testament of Milton Stanley ("Slim") Wycoff.

-3-
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Appellant Max Young was first employed by Company in
January of 1950 as a clerk, and in time was promoted to the
office of business manager.

He was also business manager of

Corporation from the time of its inception and generally
developed and managed both Mountain Service and Warehouse as
general manager.

During his tenure with the Wycoff Companies,

Mr. Young sat on their boards of directors as executive
vice-president of all four boards.

The other members of the

boards consisted of C. Leland Clayton, M. S. Wycoff and Earl
Lewis who were all stockholders directly involved in the
daily operations of the Wycoff Companies.
Appellants acquired their 25 percent interest in the
Wycoff companies through a combination of gifts from M. S.
Wycoff and purchases from the corporation.

The gifts were .

given primarily to appellant Young as compensation for his
service to the corporations and as an inducement to insure
Young's continued service in the business. Max Young worked
hard and faithfully for the corporations during his employment
to enhance the value of his interest and that of the other
shareholders.
M. S. Wycoff, the princiapl founder of the Wycoff
Companies died testate on March 3, 1966, and all of his
controlling stock in the Wycoff Companies was distributed to
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Zions under two trusts established by M. S. Wycoff fs will.
Upon the death of M. S. Wycoff, Max Young became the chief
executive officer of each of the companies, a position he
maintained with the acquiescence of Zions until February 1,
1968.
During Max Young's association with the Wycoff Companies they had a history of continued growth and expansion
into new commodities and geographic localities ("authorities").
To accomplish this expansion the companies had followed a
policy of tight financial management:

operating on a low

profit margin, and reinvesting profits into the firms (Tr.
34-35, 39-40) [Exhibits P-22, P-23, D-10].

When Max Young

assumed operational control of the Companies after M. S.
Wycoff*s death, it was his objective to continue these
historical policies and expand the Companies* territory to
include the West Coast.

(Tr. 34-35)

Acquisition of new

routes required additional equipment and added facilities
which, of course, cost money.
At the time of his death, M. S. Wycoff s principal
asset consisted of stock and debentures in the Wycoff Companies [Exhibits D-42, D-43].

The total asset value of his

estate was approximately $501,841.50 (Tr. 246) and was
subject to approximately $78,177.75 federal and $65,000
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state estate taxes (Tr. 299-300), as well as widow's allowances*
Zions wanted immediate cash to satisfy these estates liabilities and sought to utilize the Wycoff Companies as vehicles
for generating funds [e.g. Exhibits D-50, D-51].

As Zion's

principal trust executive, Claron Spencer testified that
Zions viewed the interests of the estate and the companies
as "parallel." (Tr. 256-57)
From March, 1966, until September, 1967, Zions did not
take an active interest in the daily operations of the
Wycoff companies although it was interested in obtaining
funds from them.

Max Young operated the companies during

this period and they were more profitable than ever before
but, as Mr. Young informed Claron Spencer, there were seldom
any funds available for the estate in light of the companies
needs for growth [Exhibit D-10].

Even prior to the death of

M. S. Wycoff, the companies had never maintained a regular
dividend policy.

Nevertheless, the directors of the Wycoff

Companies made every effort to assist the estate in satisfying
its liabilities. As a result of their conflicting objectives,
however, relationships between Max Young and Zions became
strained.
On September 1, 1967, a meeting was held at the request
of Claron Spencer for the purpose of expanding the boards of
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directors of each corporation from four to nine [Exhibits D11, D-12].

The estate was in need of funds, and rather than

sell some of the estate assets to satisfy these obligations,
Zions sought to obtain managerial control of the Wycoff
companies so that it could channel funds from the companies
into the estate. Appellant Max Young attended this meeting
and protested the proposed change for the reason that the
corporations had always operated with internal boards of
directors who were familiar with the needs of the companies
[Exhibit D-12].

Zions voted its controlling stock at the

meeting including certain shares of Mountain Service, the
ownership of which was at that time a matter of dispute, and
the boards of directors of each company were increased from
four to nine.

Thereafter, Zions nominated and elected five

additional members to each board.

Four of these new directors

were employees of Zions and the fifth was the attorney
representing the estate. None of the new directors had any
experience in the transportation industry (Tr. 261). As
Claron Spencer testified, the purpose of this board reorganization was to facilitate a preconceived plan for the redemption of stock and debentures and to slow down the growth of
the companies which would materially advance the interests
of the estate (Tr. 260-263).
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During November, 1967, the new boards passed resolutions limiting managements1 ability to bid on new contracts
or routes, setting a $10,000 ceiling on expenditures and
creating an Executive Committee to oversee all company
spending.

[See e.g. Exhibits P-41 and P-30 to -32]

By the

terms of these resolutions, a limitation on management was
necessitated by "certain financial commitments . • . placed
on the corporation in the near future due to the death of
the founder."

Again, as Claron Spencer testified, the

purpose of these and subsequent acts discussed below "was to
slow down the growth of the companies so that there would be
greater use of the income and assets available to the trustee
or executor" (Tr. 262).
During December, 1967, Spencer and other Zion board
members discussed plans with William Shea for the creation
of a new position of "comptroller."

Young and the other

board members were not consulted with respect to these plans
because Zions did not want Young's opposition (Tr. 265). Mr.
Shea was permitted to draft his own job description (Tr.
336-37) [Exhibit P-5] which gave him direct financial control
over the operations of the Wycoff companies.

Shea took his

instructions from Claron Spencer (Tr. 341) and understood
his job as building up corporate assets, keeping expenses
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low, and getting as much money as possible out of the Wycoff
Companies and into the hands of Zions (Tr. 334, 341-42).
Pursuant to a request by Zions, a meeting of the board of
Company was held on January 30, 1968, and a resolution was
passed, over the objection of Max Young, creating the position
of vice-president and comptroller [Exhibit D-13].

Young

objected to the resolution for the reason that it would, in
effect, take the control of the companies out of management's
hands by limiting its ability to control employees, expenditures, income and other important items.

Shea was introduced

to the board as the man who would assume the new position.
The position gave Zions the control it desired to satisfy
the needs of the estate at the expense of the companies'
normal business objectives and goals*
By letter dated February 1, 1968 [Exhibit P-2], directed
to Mr. Spencer, Young outlined his objections to the appointment of the comptroller and said that the appointment had
the effect of relieving appellant of all his duties with the
companies.

At a meeting of the board of Company held on

February 13, 1968, the board, over Mr. Young's objection and
negative vote, decided to treat the letter as a resignation
[Exhibit D-49].

At trial, Spencer testified that there was

no language of resignation in the letter (Tr. 273), and that
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Young wasn't discharged for his failure to maintain profits
for the companies (Tr. 274). On the other hand, Spencer
testified that Young's resistance with respect to Zions
plans for taking company funds to satisfy estate liabilities
was seen as a reflection of Young's poor "moral fibre." Mr*
Roger Andrus, a driver foreman for the Company, who had no
experience in management, was elected president and general
manager to replace Young at the February 13, 1968, meeting.
Appellant Young continued to serve on the boards of
directors of the Wycoff companies until October, 1968, v/hen
he was dismissed therefrom.
On November 6, 1968, the board of directors of Company
directed a stock dividend of 1800 shares of a new class of
recently created preferred stock having an aggregate par
value of $180,000.00. Appellant received 450 shares of this
preferred stock dividend [Exhibit D-5G].

Just fifteen days

later and on November 21, 19 68, the board called the preferred
stock for redemption [Exhibit P-64] at its par value of
$100.00 per share.

As reflected in the minutes, the purpose

for the call was to generate funds for the estate.

The

redemption right was to expire at 5:00 p.m. on December 2,
1968, and according to the board's resolution, stock not so
redeemed was to remain outstanding on the books of the
corporation.

There was no indication that unredeemed stock

would ever be subject to another call.

-10-
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redemption scheme was part of a preconceived plan to satisfy
liabilities of the Wycoff estate and was not part of an ongoing
business procedure.

Appellants were forced to redeem their

stock for $45,000, upon which they were forced to pay $15,000
in taxes.

The estate, however, received approximately

$110,196.00 but paid no taxes on this income because of an
exemption provided in §303 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26
U.S.C. §303.

There was no apparent business purpose for

this action, and it did not advance the financial position
of the corporations.
On December 2, 1968, debentures of Company totaling
$50,000.00 were redeemed from the estate at a par value and
the funds were again used to pay taxes.

These debentures

were not due until April 1, 1978, and bore interest at the
rate of 7 percent per annum.
According to Mr. Shea, vice-president and comptroller,
the funds used for these redemptions were borrowed by Company from Mountain Service which in turn borrowed $300,000
from Zions bank at 7 percent interest and secured the loan
with Mountain Service equipment [Exhibit P-70, P-64].

The

redemption alternative was chosen as the least expensive way
to pay off the needs of the estate because it had less tax
consequences to the estate than a dividend (Tr. 379-80} and
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because the company would not have to pay any dividends to
minority shareholders (Tr. 405). None of the funds were
used to retire other outstanding loans of the Company, but
the funds were obtained for the sole purpose of retiring the
debentures and redeeming the preferred stock (Tr. 343-44,
4 06).

Again, the debenture retirement was done at the

request of Zions (Tr. 346). More important, the redemption
was effectuated during a period of decreasing earnings (Tr.
344) [Exhibits P-58 through 63] and poor profits (Tr. 383).
As a result of this scheme, the companies were placed in a
poor credit position and had difficulty obtaining regular
business loans from lending institutions, other than Zions,
who offered better credit terms [See e.g. Exhibit P-53].
Mr. Spencer testified that the redemption tax exemption
was seen as the best alternative for acquiring funds for the
estate if the minority did not resist (Tr. 24 6).

Spencer

was aware that the companies would have to borrow funds to
accomplish the redemption (Tr. 255), that the Company was,
at that time, in a "short cash" position (Tr. 256), and that
any funds received by minority shareholders would have to be
treated as ordinary income (Tr. 247-48).

However, despite

the fact that sale of the debentures would have satisfied a
large protion of the estatefs tax liabilities, Zions was
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unwilling to market the debentures because they were unsecured
and would have had to be sold at a discount (Tr. 253).
Neither Mr. Spencer or Mr. Shea could articulate any busines
motive for these redemptions.
Although the debentures bore interest at 7 percent per
annum, their premature redemption resulted in an increased
burden on the companies because the $300,000 note to Mountain
Service was a demand not
at rates ranging on an aA
over the prime rate [Exhi
was unwilling to sell the
cause the company to incr
after to pay interest to 1
rates in excess of the pri
Zions also caused oth
Wycoff trust to be redeemer
11, 1971; $5,000 on April (
$10,000 on October 11, 1972
and $4,000 on September 6,
(Tr. 345, 357)

Zions redeei

debentures as testamentary i
of these debentures matured
interest at 7 percent.

There was no apparent business
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purpose for any of these redemptions.

Moreover, these

redemptions were effectuated during a period of financial
difficulty when the companies had other pressing business
needs for the funds [See e.g. Exhibits P-37, P-38, P-39]
A review of the books and records of the Wycoff Companies conducted by Mr. Jackson, a certified public accountant for these firms, for the years 19 65 through 1969 [Exhibit
P-29] concluded that as of February 1970:
"A

The working capital and cash balances of the
companies in total has decreased substantially
since December 31, 1967.

B.

Accounts receivable in total has increased substantially since December 31, 1967.

C.

The companies1 over-all indebtedness unde^r longterm financing has increased substantially
without any appreciable increase in assets since
December 31, 1967."

Certain accounting adjustments should be considered to
determine the real financial position of the Wycoff companies
in the years after Mr. Young's dismissal and during Zions1
control. For example, substantial insurance rebates, earned
by the companies before 1968, were attributed as income in
years after 1968. The same is true with respect to rate
increases due to the companies during 1966 and 1967.

The

depreciation schedule of the companies equipment was changed
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after 19 68 from a double-declining balance method to a I
straight line method (Tr. 358), resulting in an apparent increase
in company income after 1968 of approximately $185,000.00 to
$200,000.00, while the real asset value of the older fleet
was substantially decreased.

According to Mr. Shea the

increased income before taxes of the companies was "directly
attributable" to the depreciation method used currently as
i

•

•

. - . • . • ' . ; ; ' •

compared to the method used previously. (Tr. 360) [Exhibit
P-58]

Finally, for certain years, items of extraordinary

income were included in calculating gross income, such as
$32,504 from the sale of the Freeport Warehouse in 1972 i
[Exhibit P-58]

These adjustments caused an unrealistic

inflation of income during the years of Zions* control
resulting in an even worse financial picture than Mr. Jackson
had painted.

I

During the period 1967 through 1973 the growth of the
four companies had been 65.4 percent or 11 percent per year
[Exhibit D-71].

Appellants evidence, prepared from the

financial statements received in evidence, [proposed Exhibits
P-54 through P-57] indicated that for the period 1965 through
1973, the average annual growth rate had been 10.89 percent
per year since 1967, but from 1965 through 1967 the total

i
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:

growth was 46.17 percent, or 23.09 percent per year.

This

latter evidence comports with Mr. Spencer's own testimony as
to Zions purpose for taking control of the companies which
was "to slow down growth so that greater use of the income
and assets would be available to the trustee and executor"
(Tr. 262). A comparison of the ratios of net income to
total income for the period 1965 through 1973 reveals that
this ratio fell from an annual average of 5.56 percent
during 1965 through 1967, to the highest percentage of 3.92
percent in 1968 and as low as 0.29 percent in 1967. Again
these figures further illustrate the success of Zions1
announced purpose in managing the Wycoff companies.
Perhaps one of the major problems with Zion's control
of the Wycoff Companies was its failure to provide skilled,
competent, and qualified management.

As Mr. Shea testified

"we floundered around with a management team in a situation
for which we were totally unprepared;"

"We had a management

team that didn't know how to get rate increases;" (Tr. 393,
413)" "I have never been a manager for a company.
hired to manage the Wycoff Company.

I was not

I have never attempted

to manage the Wycoff Company or any of its affiliates."
(Tr. 375). Mr. Andrus was elected president and general
manager but he had no previous managerial experience.
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Thus, while the Wycoff Companies labored under poor
management, decreasing earnings, and increasing debt, all to
the disadvantage of the minority shareholders, Zions and the
estate reaped a harvest of corporate assets*
A related dispute between appellants and respondents
concerning the management of corporate affairs after the
death of M. S. Wycoff centered around the interpretation of
Milton Stanley Wycofffs will.

Mr. Wycofffs intention on the

matter of succession in management clearly appears in his
will.

It was his desire that the trustee operate the busi-

ness but that, if business conditions did not permit operation,
it was within the trustee's discretion not to operate and
preserve them.

If they were operated, control was to be

transferred to Bruce Wycoff gradually through the distribution of stock or otherwise at such time as the businesses
could be properly managed and controlled by him. [Exhibit P1 p . 4 ] . •::

The direction in the will relating to Mr. Young is much
more emphatic.

If the trustee elected to operate any business...

"...then and in that event I direct ray Trustee to
continue the operation of such corporations or businesses by continuing as executive officers and directors those persons who were occupying similar
positions in said corporations or businesses at the
time of my death, including directors and other corporate, officers. However, I direct my Trustee to
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name Max W. Young, if he is then living and is.then
serving as an executive of any such corporations or
businesses, as the chief executive of said corporations or businesses so long as he discharges his
office or offices with fidelity and so long as said
corporations or businesses are operated at a profit..•"
[Exhibit P-l pp5 & 6]. (Emphasis added)
The books and records of the four companies certainly
show that they were operated profitably by Mr. Young from
the time of Mr. Wycoff!s death until his removal by the
bank, as was recognized by Mr. Spencer (Tr. 274). Apparently
the only reason for Mr. Young's removal by Zions was his
refusal to assist the trustee in his plan to drain off
Company assets for the exclusive benefit of the Wycoff
I estate.
The final area of disagreement between the parties concerns the transfer of corporate stock after the death of
". "M. S. Wycoff.

An agreement dated April 26, 1965, was

executed by M. S. Wycoff and his wife LaPearl, Max W. Young
and his wife Audrey, and C. Leland Clayton and his wife
Eugenia.

The agreement recited that Mr. Wycoff, Mr. Young

and Mr. Clayton were each insured by a life insurance policy
with Mountain Service as the beneficiary.

It was agreed

that upon the death of any of the insured parties the proceeds
of the policy received by Mountain Service would be used to
their full extent to redeem stock owned by the deceased.
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Upon Mr. Wycoff1s death Mountain Service received
$48,000.00 from the insurance policy. Pursuant to the
agreement, Mountain Service tendered the funds to Zions as
executor and demanded voting stock of Wycoff Company at book
value.

Zions interpreted the agreement of April 26, 1965,

differently than the appellants and insisted that only nonvoting stock of Wycoff Company could be transferred to
Mountain Service under the agreement [Exhibit D-71]. Despite
this dispute as to what stock should be transferred, Mountain
Service, by letter dated May 31, 1966 [Exhibit P-40], sent
the $48,000.00 in insurance proceeds to Zions Bank because
the bank had indicated that it was urgently needed by the
estate.

The bank held the $48,000.00 without tendering any

stock to Mountain Service for a year and three months before
returning the money to Mountain Service [Exhibits D-4]. The
money was returned by Mountain Service to Zions as required
by the agreement but was again sent back on November 14/
1967 [Exhibit D-46].

Finally, after Zions had gained control

of the board of Mountain Service, the money was deposited in
its account [Exhibit P-41] and was eventually used in its
operations.

Zions never has transferred any stock to Mountain

Service pursuant to the agreement of April 26, 1965, although
the agreement clearly contemplated the transfer of some
stock.
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Before his death, M. S. Wycoff indicated his intention
that Max Young receive sufficient stockholder control to
insure his continued management of the Wycoff Companies, so
that if and when his son, Bruce Wycoff, should elect to
continue the business, he would inherit a viable, profitable
and on-going enterprise.

A tax protest prepared in 1962,

and signed by Mr. & Mrs. Wycoff clearly shows this intention
[Exhibit P-30].
"The redemption of the Class B stock which had
been purchased was determined to be necessary in order
to avoid problems with respect to the succession of
management. Max Young had been employed by the company for several years and had demonstrated management
ability. He stated that he would prefer to start a
business of his own unless he was given the opportunity
to acquire an equity interest in the operations. Since
he was a young man, he was selected to assume management of the operations on the retirement or death of
Mr. Wycoff and arrangements were made to sell or give
Mr. Young sufficient stock for him, together with
trustees of Wycoff r s estate, to control the corporation. To accomplish this, it became apparent that
the Class B stock should be held in the same proportion as the Class A stock. It was agreed that the
Class B stock which had been issued for cash should
be redeemed in order to provide the balance required
to insure the management succession program determined
to be in the best interest of the companies. This
adjustment chould not have been accomplished by dividend
distribution." (Emphasis added)
Appellant always operated the Wycoff business with the
intention of fulfilling the wishes of M. S. Wycoff and
preserving a successful business for Bruce Wycoff.
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At the time of his dismissal, Mr. Young was earning
between $30,000.00 and $35,000.00 per year from the companies plus other benefits, including car expenses. A
portion of his income was attributable to Eagle Moving
Company which he had acquired in 1960. After his dismissal,
he earned approximately $19,500.00 in 1968, $20,907.00 in
1969, $20,760.00 in 1970. $13,080.00 in 1971, $9,780.00 in
1972, and $13,000.00 in 1973.

[Exhibit D-79] •

In August of 1971, William Shea, vice-president and
comptroller of the companies, offered $275,000.00 for the
plaintiffs1 stock interest in the Wycoff companies.

The

total was to be paid in annual installments of $25,000.00,
with nothing down.

As of December 31, 1970, the book value

of the appellant's stock was $348,882.00, and as of December
31, 1971, it was $376,665.00.

Taking into consideration the

operating rights of the Wycoff companies, which both Mr.
Young and Mr. Shea testified were the most valuable assets,
appellant's interest in the companies was easily worth
between $600,000 and $1,000,000.

In light of these facts,

Mr. Shea's offer of August, 19 71, was rejected.
The only disbursements' from the companies since Mr.
Young's departure in 1968 have

been the redemption of

preferred stock for $180,000.00 in November, 1968, and
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$124,439.00 in dividends paid by Company, Warehouse and
Corporation in May, 1973 [Exhibits D-85, D~86 and D-87].
The occasion for each such distribution was a tax liability
which the estate or trust desired to cover.
At the present time there is no policy regarding the
payment of dividends by the companies-

If past performance

is any indication, dividends will be paid if and when Zions
Bank determines that funds are required for the trust which
it controls and only after all other methods of getting
money from the companies to the bank have been exhausted.
No consideration v/ill be given to the needs of the minority,
who have no control over an investment with a book value of
at least $560,000. Appellant Max Young has invested a substantia!
protion of his adult life in four closely held corporations
and is now locked in with no hope of either selling his
minority interest at v/hat it is worth or of having any voice
in corporate affairs.

ARGUMENT
•

I

THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE CONTRARY TO
THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND REPRESENT A
WHOLESALE ADOPTION OF DEFENDANTS1 PROPOSED FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS WITHOUT THE EXERCISE OF INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT.
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As the record shows, the trial court's Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and the Judgment were prepared by
defendants' counsel and were adopted, without alteration, by
the court as its own.

Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., provides:

In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury...
the court shall find the facts specially and state
separately its conclusions of law thereon... (Emphasis
added)
It is the unquestioned duty of the trial court to make
findings on all material issues raised by the pleadings,
Piper v. Hatch, 86 Utah 292, 43 P.2d 700, 701 (1935), and
such findings must be in conformity with the evidence presented at trial, Hathaway v. United Tintic Mines Co., 42
Utah 520, 132 P. 388, 389 (1913).

While the court may seek

the assistance of counsel in preparing its findings and
conclusions, ultimate responsibility lies with the court
which must exercise its independent judgment to evaluate all
the facts without prejudice or bias.

The findings must be

objective, and, in equity cases, this Court retains the
power to review the record and pass on the weight and sufficiency of the findings if it is debatable whether the record
supports the lower court.

The findings and conclusions in

this case represent only one side of the evidence and are
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a wholesale adoption of the defendants' point of view.

This

court should exercise an independent review of the evidence
and make its judgment on the basis of the record.
.II
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO HOLD THAT THE ACTS OF RESPONDENTS WERE NOT "OPPRESSIVE" AND A MISAPPLICATION OR
WASTE OF CORPORATE ASSETS WITHIN THE MEANING OF 16-10-92
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953.
Section 16-10-92 U.C.A. 1953, enacted in 1961, was
taken verbatim from the Model Business Corporations Act
prepared by a committee of the American Bar Association.
This section provides, in part:
The district court shall have full power to liquidate the assets and business of a corporation::
(a) In an action by a shareholder when it is
established:
* * *

(2) that the acts of the director or
those in control of the corporation are illegal,
oppressive or fraudulent; or
*

*

-k

(4) that the corporate assets are being
misapplied or wasted.

-24Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

To the best of appellants1 knowledge, there are no Utah
decisions interpreting the meaning of the above quoted
statute, but in light of the fact that several other states
also have adopted this section of the Model Business Corporations Act, the decisions of those jurisdictions are illustrative in interpreting the meaning of this legislation.
The most ambiguous portion of this statute is the term
"oppressive."

In determining the legislative intent underly-

ing this term, several concepts have been deemed important.
First, the relationship between the shareholders of a closely
held corporation is similar to that of partners in a partnership.

All shareholders generally are engaged in the active

pursuit of corporate business, the success of the business
depends on maintaining a harmonious relationship among
shareholders, and usually there is no recognized market for
an individual shareholder's interest.

See Comment, Rights of

the Minority Shareholders to Dissolve the Closely Held Corporation, 43 Calif. L.Rev. 514 (1955).

The meaning of

"oppression" when considered in the context of a closely
held corporation must be different from its meaning in the
context of a publicly held corporation.

The court must be

free to exercise greater liberality in dissolving closely
held corporations where the harm to the general public is
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minimal and where a "frozen" minority shareholder may not
easily withdraw his investment as in a partnership.
Second, the directors and majority shareholders of a
corporation owe a fiduciary duty to all shareholders and the
"fiduciary relationship" among shareholders is an important
element of oppression in an action under the Utah statute.
See Note, Oppression as a Statutory Ground for Corporate Disolution, 1965 Duke.L.J. 128, 132-33.
"The devolution of unlimited power imposes on the
holders of the majority of the stock a'correlative duty,
the duty of a fiduciary or agent, to the holders of the
minority of the stock, who can act only through them
—the duty to exercise good faith, care, and diligence
to make the property of the corporation produce the
largest possible amount, to protect the interests of
the holders of the minority of the stock, and to
secure and pay over to them their just proportion
of the income and of the proceeds of the corporate
property. A dominant or controlling stockholder is
declared to be a fiduciary. 18 Am.Jur.2d, Corporations §497
See also, Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal
Co., 64 F.2d 817 (4 Cir. 1933).

A reviewing court must

carefully evaluate the exercise of these fiduciary duties in
deciding whether certain conduct is "oppressive."

-26-
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Third, all the shareholders of a corporation have a
right to be treated equally and fairly; benefits accruing to
some stockholders, and not to others, can be grounds for
dissolution.

As one commentator states,

!f

[t]he 'oppression1

required by [the Model Act] has normally been read to mean
abuse of corporate position for private financial gain at
the expense of other stockholders."

Note, Dissolution--

Denial of Right to Participate in Management of Close
Corporation Entitles Shareholder to Liquidation, 74 Harv.L.Rev,
1461, 1462 (1961); Long v. Wilson Stove & Mfg. Co., 277
Ill.App. 57 (1934).

Where a minority shareholder has lost

any effective voice in corporate affairs, the integrity of
his investment will be in jeopardy unless the majority
shareholders operate the business with fairness and equal
concern for all shareholders.
Finally, this statute was intended to provide remedial
relief for abused shareholders.

Even before these statutes

were enacted, courts frequently exercised their equitable
power to dissolve corporations in which the majority shareholders had taken advantage of the minority.

See, Hornstein,

A Remedy for Corporate Abuse—Judicial Power to Wind Up a
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Corporation at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder, 40 Colum,
L.Rev. 220 (1940); Anno., "Inherent power of equity, at
instance of a stockholder, to appoint a receiver for, or to
wind up a solvent, going corporation, on ground of fraud,
mismanagement or dissensions," 43 A.L.R. 288 (1926); 61
A.L.R. 1212 (1929); 91 A.L.R. 665 (1934).

The remedial,

equitable nature of this action forms the basis for the
current statute and should be considered when seeking
legislative intent.
While the definition of "oppressive" conduct is inherently
flexible and permits substantial judicial latitude, the
cases have fleshed out the meaning of this term.
...[S]ome substance has been injected into th€>se
terms [oppression, misconduct, gross mismanagement]
by decisions which have held that majority actions
such as plundering the corporation, siphoning off
profits through excessive salaries to themselves
as officers, and running the corporation for the
sole benefit of the majority, constitute misconduct
or gross mismanagement justifying dissolution.
Note, Oppression as a Statutory Ground for Dissolution,
supra at 131 & n. 18. See Tri-City Elec. Service Co. v.
Jarvis, 206 Ind. 5, 185 N.E. 136 (1933) (majority shareholder
misappropriated assets, refused to pay dividends, excluded
minority from management); Klugh v. Coronula Mining Co., 66
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S.C. 100, 44 S.E. 566 (1902) (majority shareholder paid
himself large dividend, neglected the corporation, lost
customers for the corporation); Hampton v. Buchanan, 51
Wash.155, 98 P. 374 (1908) (majority shareholder raised own
salary to absorb profit, deprived minority of a voice in
management).

The Commonwealth cases take a very liberal

view of a minority shareholder's rights and only require a
showing of "justifiable lack of confidence" to support a
decree of dissolution.
[1924] A.C. 783.

E.g. Lock v. John Blackwood, Ltd.,

The very purpose of a corporation is to

make a profit (§ 16-10-2(a), U.C.A. (1953) and, when the
majority stockholders use the corporation as a vehicle for
any other purpose, the minority have justifiable grounds for
seeking dissolution.
The most commonly used definition of "oppressive"
conduct was provided by the Illinois Supreme Court in Central
Standard Life Insurance Company v. Davis, 10 111.2d 566, 141
N.E. 2d 45 (1957):
"The word 'oppressive1 does not carry an
essential inference of imminent disaster; it can,
we think, contemplate a continuing course of conduct.
"Plaintiff argues that the word 'oppressive'
does not necessarily savor of fraud, and that the
absence of 'mismanagement, or misapplication of
assets' does not prevent a finding that the conduct
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of the defendants has been oppressive. We agree with
that interpretation, and we reject defendants" argument
that the word is substantially synonymous with 'illegal1
and 'fraudulent.1 Misapplication of assets or mismanagement of funds are not, as we read the statute, indispensable ingredients of 'oppressive1 conduct." 141 N.E.
2d at p. 50.
Mere continued corporate existence in the absence of prospective

profitable operation might in an appropriate case

constitute oppression.

The overall emphasis seems to be on

the "cumulative effects of . . . many acts and incidents,
and their . . . continuing nature", Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 111.2d 208, 221, 170 N.E.2d 131, 138
(1960). The recital of numerous acts of misconduct involving
the sole asset of the corporation, coupled with disproportionate loss to the minority, may constitute a claim of
"oppression."

"Thus, an abuse of corporate position for

private gain at the expense of the stockholders is 'oppressive 1 conduct. . . .. [A]s to authorize the dissolution of
the corporation. . . ." Baker v. Commercial Body Builders,
Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 394 (Ore. 1973)
In White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972),
the Virginia Supreme Court upheld a lower court finding that
the acts of a majority stockholder were oppressive.

White

owned 55% of the stock of P & W Oil Company and Perkins
owned the remaining 45%.

The corporation had filed a Subchapter
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S election and thus its profits were attributed directly to
the shareholders for federal tax purposes-

During fiscal

1968-69 the corporation showed earnings of $10,000.00 for
federal tax purposes and White & Perkins were each required
to report their portion thereof. White, however, refused to
pay a dividend despite the fact that Perkins was forced to
pay federal tax on the income. White also owned a service
station which purchased supplies from the corporation on
open account.

He allowed the outstanding balance owed by

the service station to the corporation to go from nothing to
over $12,000.00 apparently after Perkins had indicated that
he would attempt to dissolve it. Although White had initially agreed to lease his service station to the corporation,
he later refused to do so, but at the time that Perkins
sought dissolution, White billed the corporation for.rental
on the service station.

The Virginia Supreme Court agreed

with the lower court that these acts were oppressive and
indicated that the corporation should either be dissolved or
a custodian appointed, these being the two alternatives
provided for by Virginia's statute.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that unfair treatment of minority preferred
shareholders was grounds for the appointment of a receiver
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in Tower Hill Connellsville Coke Co, v. Piedmont Coal Co,,
33 F.2d 703 (4 Cir. 1929), and eventually ordered dissolution
and liquidation because of the activities of the majority.
Tower Hill Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 64
F.2d 817 (4 Cir. 1933).

The action was brought by the

holders of preferred stock, entitled to a 6 percent cumulative
annual dividend which had not been paid for a number of
years.

No dividend could be paid to the common stockholders

until the preferred dividend had been paid or set aside.

Of

course, in liquidation the preferred stock was entitled to
be paid at par plus any cumulative dividends which were in
arrears.

Although the preferred stock had the right to

vote, the amount of issued and outstanding common stock
prevented the preferred shareholders from having any voice
in operating the company.
The only asset of the corporation was stock in a Pennsylvania corporation which owned and operated a coal mine and
coke plant.
Two considerations led the court to hold that the
minority preferred shareholders were not being treated
"fairly": first, the purchase of preferred shares at very
low prices and retirement thereof while dividends thereon
were greatly in arrears, and second, the contention by the
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company that all of the assets of the subsidiary were necessary to improve the coke plant rather than pay dividends.
Additional borrowing was also required for this purpose.
The court said that if the company had funds with which to
purchase preferred shares at a very low price and retire the
same, it should have funds with which to pay the 6 percent
cumulative dividend.

Under these circumstances the court

authorized the appointment of receivers to go into the
Pennsylvania courts and

...bring all necessary and proper

actions to protect the interests of the plaintiffs...".
F.2d at p. 709.
By the time the second Tower Hill case reached the
court, the corporation had dissolved the Pennsylvania subsidiary and distributed its assets to Tower Hill.

Both before

and after this transfer the Pennsylvania corporation and
Tower Hill exchanged and sold properties to corporations
controlled by the "Hillman interests,11 which also controlled
Tower Hill and the Pennsylvania corporation.

According to

the court all of these enterprises had interlocking directors
and this "board apparently had no independent judgment of
its own and was merely used by J. H. Hillman, Jr., as a
willing instrument to carry out whatever he dictated."
F.2d at p. 820.
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64

Referring to the minority stockholders the court said:
"We have here no desire of stockolders to escape
the consequence of their stock purchase nor desire to
withdraw from a bad bargain, but an earnest effort by
these plaintiffs to rescue at least some part of their
investment from an arbitrary, unjust, and tyrannical
domination by a ruthless majority - a majority that
acts entirely without regard to that trust relationship that exists between a controlling majority and a
minority in a stock company. While the controlling
majority are not to be deemed trustees in any technical sense, they have a real duty to protect the interests
of the minority when they undertake to run a corporation
without giving them (the minority) a voice in its management. The law governing the control of corporations by a majority of stockholders is based upon
fair dealing and a proper conduct of the affairs of
a corporation with due respect to the rights of the
minority by those in control. These elements of justice we do not find in this case." 64 F.2d at p. 824The Court went on to say:
"When several persons have a common interest in
property, equity will not allow one to appropriate
it exclusively to himself, or to impair its vailue to
the others. Community of interest involves mutual
obligation. Persons occupying this relation towards
each other are under an obligation to make the property or fund productive of the most that can be obtained from it for all who are interested in it, at
the expense of those whose rights in it are the same
as their own, are unfaithful to the relation they
have assumed, and are guilty, at least, of constructive fraud." 64 F.2d at p. 826. [Emphasis added].
See also, Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 6 Ill.App.3d
488, 285 N.E.2d 574 (1972); Gray v. Hall, 10 Ill.App.3d
1030, 205 N.E.2d 506, 509 (1973).
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Henn, in his treatise on Corporations sums up the
relationship between fiduciary duty and minority oppression
as follows:
Since directors, with respect to their exercies
of their management functions, owe fiduciary duties
to the corporation to exercise unbiased judgment
in the best interests of the corporation as a whole,
any attempt by directors to favor one intracorporate
group to the detriment of another breaches such duties
to the corporation and, in a sense, violates the implied terms in the share contract between the corporation and any oppressed shareholder to the effect that
corporate affairs will be managed in the best interests
of the corporation.
Controlling shareholders, especially when approving
extraordinary corporate matters requiring shareholder
approval, are usually subjected to fiduciary duties.
Such fiduciary duties preclude "fraud on the minority"
or "oppression of the minority", or fraudulent, bad
faith, or unfair results. In close corporations, some
fiduciary duties among the shareholders, possibly
analogous to those among partners, have been recognized.
Henn, Law of Corporations, §240, (West,2d ed. 1970)
(Emphasis added)
The above mentioned principals should guide this court
in its interpretation of the statute and in its evaluation
of the evidence.

The trial court, however, concluded that:

Defendant Wycoff corporations and their Board of
Directors did not act in an improper or oppressive
manner in violation of the rights of the plaintiffs as
minority stockholders under Section 16-10-92 Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, or at all. [Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusion No. 1]
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It cannot seriously be contested, as the record in this
matter illustrates, that Zions Bank directed the operations
of the Wycoff companies with two principal objectives in
mind:

first, to obtain funds from the companies whenever

such funds were required by Zions as trustee to satisfy
estate liabilities, and second, to preserve the ownership of
the corporations for future transfer to Bruce Wycoff.

While

the latter objective was mentioned in M.S. Wycoff's will,
the bank never gave any serious consideration to the other
provisions of the will which directed that Max Young was to
remain as chief executive and that the businesses were to be
continued in their historical manner.
As controlling shareholder and director of these companies, Zions clearly abdicated its primary obligation,
namely, to maximize profits for all shareholders and distribute those profits in the form of regular dividends.

In all

its actions, Zions operated the corporations without regard
to the interests of the minority shareholders, and instead,
used the corporations as a vehicle for siphoning off assets
for the sole and exclusive benefit of the Wycoff estate.
Respondents1 conduct is analogous to those cases where controlling shareholders and/or directors pay themselves excessive salaries, waste corporate assets, or otherwise deal
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in corporate affairs for their own self interest and in
violation of the interests of the other corporate owners.
These cases have almost uniformly held that such conduct
constitutes oppression, misconduct, gross mismanagementf
and, in some cases even fraud, justifying dissolution of the
corporations at the request of the abused minority shareholders.

The instant case is the same.

On various occasions, Zions compelled the premature
redemption of debentures held by majority shareholders and
further redeemed preferred stock to generate income for the
estate.

Zions also compelled the corporation to borrow

funds at higher than normal interest rates to effectuate
these redemptions.

Under 16-10-5 U.C.A. 1953, the repur-

chase of shares by a corporation is permitted "only to the
extent of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus" without
a two-thirds vote of all shares. And 16-10-44 U.C.A. 1953
further restricts the payment dividends to "unrestricted
earned surplus."

The intent of these sections is to prohibit

distributions of corporate assets which would damage the
corporation's financial position to the detriment of corporate
creditors and non-distributee owners.

The distributions and

purchases made at the direction of Zions were contrary to
the spirit and intent of these statutes. Even if there was
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some earned surplus on the books to justify the stock dividend,
redemption of debentures and repurchase of stock, these
earnings were needed to enable the corporations to obtain
credit and satisfy the needs of growth.

Moreover, Zions

distributions were not intended to benefit all shareholders,
but were designed for the estate's exclusive benefit.
Perhaps if Zions was the sole owner of these corporations
its conduct would have been excusable, since, in that event,
only their own interests would have been risked.

In this

case, however, appellants made substantial investments of
time, money and ability in these businesses over a period of
20 years, they owned 25 percent of the corporations and had a
right, as partial owners, to have the corporations managed
in such a way as would increase the value of thier investments.

They had the right to see the corporations grow and

prosper.

Instead, Zions operated these businesses as if it

were the only owner; as if the interests of the estate and
the corporations were "parallel"; as if corporate assets
were its exclusive property; as if the minority shareholders
were non-existent.

It was Zion's announced purpose to "slow

the growth" of the corporations so that it could drain off
assets to satisfy its own needs.

Clearly this is the kind

of "oppressive" conduct contemplated in 16-10-92 U.C.A. 1953
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and against which the statute was enacted as a form of
relief.
The largest distribution from the companies ($180,000.00
in 1968) had disastrous tax consequences for the minority.
From 1968 until 1973 (5 years) nothing was paid the minority
and the companies obviously suffered financially from the
large 1968 payment.

Furthermore, $50,000.00 in long-term

debentures bearing a low rate of interest were prematurely
redeemed from the estate in December, 1968; another $56,000.00
in those same kind of debentures were prematurely redeemed
by the companies between 1968 and 1973.

These transactions

occured without any apparent business justification while
the minority received no dividends, other corporate debt was
not satisfied in the same manner, and the companies were
forced to incur additional debt at higher interest rates.
Only when the bank was in need of tax money, was a distribution declared which again had adverse tax conceguences for
the minority.

Moreover, as the record indicates, Zions had

other non-oppressive alternatives for satisfying the estate's
tax liabilities, but it steadfastly refused to exercise
these alternatives.
The grossly inadequate offer of $275,000.00 by William
Shea to Mr. Young for the plaintiffs1 stock in the companies

-39Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in 1961 evidences an attempt to squeeze out the minority.
The offer included no down payment and small annual payments.
It was well below the book value of the stock and both men
were well aware that the most valuable asset of Wycoff
Company, its operating authorities,, were hardly ever reflected in the book value of the stock.
The failure of the bank to transfer any stock to Mountain
Service pursuant to the April 26, 1965, agreement demonstrates
its determination to run the Wycoff companies as it saw fit
regardless of contractual or legal obligations imposed upon
it.

This is to say nothing of its failure to comply with

the duty imposed upon it by M. S. Wycofffs will to employ
Mr. Young.
In close corporations, not only do the normal fiduciary
duties of controlling shareholders apply, but, because of
the partnership-like relationship among the owner-directormanager shareholders, a higher, more carefully scrutinized
standard of fiduciary responsibility is required.

While

such fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders do not
disqualify them from exercising their voting rights with
respect to various matters, they must do so with fairness,
equality and due regard to the rights and interests of the
minority.

The evidence in this case demonstrates that
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respondents have not only flagrantly abused and violated
their fiduciary duties, but are likely to continue to do so
in the future.

As a result, appellants are entitled to

reestablish the integrity of their ownership interest
through a dissolution of the Wycoff corporations.
Ill
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO REFUSE TO ENFORCE THE PROVISIONS OF THE M. S. WYCOFF WILL WITH RESPECT TO THE RETENTION OF MAX YOUNG.
Respondents argue that the control of the corporation
is vested in the board of directors whose right and duty to
appoint or discharge supersedes any wish or direction expressed in the will of M. S. Wycoff.

Such a contention is

contrary to the law as established in those few cases where
this issue has been adjudicated.

In the case of In re Pit-

tock's Will, 102 Ore. 159, 199 P. 633 (1921), a majority
shareholder of a newspaper corporation bequeathed his stock
to trustees for a period of years, during which period it
should be held intact and none sold.

The will expressly

provided that the trustees should vote the stock in favor of
themselves as directors of the corporation and that Harden
should be retained as manager and Piper as editor.

The

court in reference to the testatorfs right to make the above
provisions in his will, stated:
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"The testator was the owner in his individual
right of a majority of the stock of the corporation.
He had a right, as an attribute of property exercised
in testamentary form, to direct how and for whom the
stock should be voted. No one can rightly say that,
if Pittock living had announced his intention steadily
for 20 years to vote for certain directors who would
in turn carry out certain policies as to employees,
he could have been enjoined from the consummation
of his purpose. How, then, can it be said that
he cannot direct his trustees to do that same thing
after his death, for a limited period?
*

"k "k

In this instance, during his lifetime th€> testator could and probably did vote his stock so as
to secure the election of directors to his liking.
From the testimony it is plain that Mr. Pittock
desired to perpetuate, for a time, at least, the
existing personnel of the editorial and managerial
departments of his corporation, the Oregonian Publishing Company, of which he was the principal owner,
and to maintain the standing of the Oregonia, which
under his direction had attained wide influence in the
newspaper world..... It was certainly lawful for the
living owner of two-thirds of the stock so to shape
the directorate as to accomplish this purpose,.
Equally after his death, so far as he lawfully could
direct by testamentary disposition of his property,
it was competent to promote the same end by the same
means." [Emphasis added]
The argument was then made that to give effect to the
intention of the testator would be in conflict with the
trustees1 obligations as directors to carry out the real
interests of the corporation.

The court considered whether

the words "desire" and "request," as used in the will directing the trustees to retain the employees, were precatory
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but indicated that even if mandatory the provision was not
thereby illegal.

The court stated:

"More than all that, it is not shown or intimated
that the agreement, if there was one, to employ Morden
and Piper, would be harmful to the best interests
of the corporation or hurtful to the interests of the
other stockholders, or that it was based upon any
benefit private or personal to Pittock. Their long
retention in the service of the corporation attests
their ability and faithfulness, and in the light of
the best authorities it was legitimate for the controlling stockholder so to shape the direction of
his property and his testamentary instructions to
his trustees as to express his best judgment and
give it effect in corporate operation through the
regular channel of a board of directors elected by
that stock." [Emphasis added]
M. S. Wycoff f s shareholdings in each of the four subject corporations represents a clear majority of the voting
stock which, had he been alive, would undoubtedly be the
basis for sufficient voting power to carry out his wishes.
When the stock of Max Young and his family are coupled with
that of the trustee, they hold between 80 percent and 86
percent of the stock in the four subject corporations.
For similar holdings, see In Re Peinston's Estate, 196
Misc. 590, 92 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1949); and Myers v. Pink, 42
Ill.App.2d 230, 191 N.E.2d 659 (1963).
Although it would be impractical for Max Young to reassume office as the chief executive of the Wycoff companies,
the conduct of the bank in disregarding its legal duty to
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employ him further demonstrates its determination to run
these companies for the sole and exclusive benefit of the
trusts which it controls and to preserve them for Bruce
Wycoff.

The interests of minority shareholders play no part

in bank decisions*
IV
IN WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO FAIL TO ENFORCE OR GIVE
ANY EFFECT TO THE APRIL 26, 1965, AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE
TRANSFER OF STOCK TO MOUNTAIN SERVICE CORPORATION THROUGH
THE USE OF INSURANCE PROCEEDS.

,

On April 26, 1965, M. S. Wycoff, Max Young, C. Leland
Clayton, their wives, and Bruce Wycoff executed an agreement
whereby the life insurance proceeds from a Group Life Insurance Policy on the lives of M. S. Wycoff, Max Young, C.
Leland Clayton and Bruce Wycoff would be paid to Mountain
Service, Inc., as beneficiary, upon the death of any one of
the insureds and "said proceeds will be used to redeem, to
the extent of such proceeds, the stock that each deceased
...owned in said Four Corporations at the time of his death."
[Emphasis added]

The agreement, by its terms, was binding

on the parties successors in interest, including without
limitation, any decedent's estate.

[Exhibit P-3]

The

agreement further recited that "[t]he purpose and consider-
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ation for this action is well known, understood and mutually
agreed to by the parties hereto, the receipt, sufficiency
and validity of said consideration being expressly acknowledged by each and all of the parties hereto."
After M. S. Wycoff's death, $48,000 in insurance proceeds
were paid to Mountain Service, Inc. None of these proceeds
have ever been used for the redemption or purchase of any
stock.

A dispute arose between appellants and respondents

concerning the kind of stock which should be redeemed;
respondents contended that it was preferred and voting stock
in the ratio of 14:1, and appellants contended that only
voting stock should be redeemed.

Admittedly, the agreement

is ambiguous with respect to the kind of stock contemplated
for the redemption, and parol evidence was admitted on this
question.

There is no dispute, however, that the redemption

of some stock was contemplated by the parties to the agreement.
The agreement has never been modified or recinded by the
parties thereto.
Generally, an agreement among shareholders to combine
in the exercise of their shareholder functions is valid on
the ground that shareholders may do collectively what they
can do individually so long as there is an absence of fraud
or some other illegal objective.

See, Henn, The Law of
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Corporations, §267 (West, 2d ed. 1970); 19 Am.Jur.2d Corporations §684.

These agreements may be judicially enforced as

contracts by a party thereto.

The only exception to this

general rule is where shareholders attempt to interfere with
the direction of the board of directors concerning the
proper management of the corporation, but even in these
cases where the interference is slight, there is no damage
to the corporation or to the public, and the shareholders
are also the directors of the corporation, the agreements
have been recognized as valid and enforceable in many jurisdictions.
641 (1939).

See e.g., Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E.
Henn, supra at p. 532, summarizes the subject

as follows:
Agreements by shareholders qua shareholders (absent
fraud on the minority or other illegal object) involve no impingement on the "statutory norms" and
are valid. Agreements which go beyond this and
only slightly impinge on the "statutory norms1" are,
under the "no damage" test valid if they do not
injure creditors, the public, or the shareholders;
the public is not damaged by slight impingements
on the "statutory norms"; shareholders clearly are
not damaged if they all are parties to the agreement,
and possibly are not damaged even when less than all
of the shareholders are parties.
In the instant case, the parties to the April 26, 1965,
agreement dealt only with the transfer of their individually
owned property.

They elected to use Mountain Service as a
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vehicle to effectuate the desired transfer but also provided
Mountain Service with sufficient funds (the insurance proceeds)
to effectuate this transfer.

The parties were also directors

of Mountain Service, and there would have been no damage
whatsoever to Mountain Service in complying with the terms
of the agreement.

Each of the parties transferred their

right to select a beneficiary in consideration for compliance
with the agreement and each party has a right to demand that
the agreement be enforced according to its terms.

If those

terms are ambiguous, then this court should seek the intent
of the parties and enforce the agreement according to that
intention, or remand to the trial court for a finding on
that issue.
V
LIQUIDATION AND DISSOLUTION OF THE WYCOFF COMPANIES IS AN
APPROPRIATE REMEDY TO REDRESS THE OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT OF THE
RESPONDENTS.
In determining whether dissolution and liquidation is
an appropriate remedy to rectify oppressive conduct on the
part of majority shareholders, this court should first, look
to the facts existing at the time the complaint was filed;
Sullivan v. Central Land Co., 173 Ala. 426, 55 So. 612
(1911); second, determine whether dissolution will provide
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effective relief to the minority stockholders; and lastly
consider whether there is some alternative solution which
will be as effective for the minority.

Using this analysis,

dissolution of the Wycoff companies appears to be the most
effective remedy for the appellants.
Mr. Shea testified that the primary purpose of organizing four independent corporations was to achieve tax
advantages and that this multi-purpose'tax advantage had
been dissipated as of the end of 1974 (Tr. 364) . Mr. Shea
further testified that the business and operations of Wycoff
Warehouse and Wycoff Corporation are somewhat autonomous in
that they are not closely connected with the business of
Wycoff Company and Mountain Service, except for the common
use of facilities, and that, with proper lease arrangements,
the operations could be severed from one another in such a
way as to permit their continued operation without too much
upset (Tr. 364-65).

Mr. Young's testimony also supports

this conclusion (Tr. 429-31).

In fact, at one time Shea

attempted to sell the warehousing corporations to generate
needed captial but had limited success because of the high
corporate debt burden (Tr. 261). A dissolution arrangement
could easily be formulated to sever the control of the four
corporations and distribute the assets from one or more of
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these corporations to appellants in exchange for their stock
in the remaining corporations.

Of course, any additional

boot would have to be paid by the respective parties•
A second alternative would be to liquidate the assets
of all the corporations and distribute these assets to the
shareholders in exchange for their stock.

This remedy is

less advantageous since it would result in the discontinuation of four on-going businesses but it would result in the
most equitable apportionment of interests and could be
designed to minimize any adverse consequences.

Finally, the

court could appoint an independent accountant to appraise
the worth of appellant's stock and then make arrangements to
compel the purchase of appellants stock by the four companies
at its true value.
If none of these alternatives is chosen, appellants
will be left without any way of protecting their investment
in these corporations; an investment which represents appellants' contribution of time, energy, money, and ability to
the corporate business over a period of more than 20 years.
Appellants are not donee beneficiaries of their stock; they
earned and paid for this interest through hard work, fidelity
to corporate affairs, and the forebearance of alternative
investments and employment.

Appellants' close association
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with these companies served to protect and enhance their
investment as well as the investments of the other shareholders.

Nov; appellants have been ousted from corporate

management, have lost any effective voice in corpoirate
affairs, and are victims of a single-minded majority who
seek only to use the corporations to further the interests
of the majority.
Appellants have no reasonable expectation of future
dividends; they must look forward to continued mismanagement
of corporate affairs, disinterest on the part of management
with the pursuit of profits, and unjustified drains on
corporate revenues.

The minority are locked in to a cor-

porate structure over which they have no control, which is
not interested in enhancing the value of their investment,
and which refuses to purchase their otherwise unmarketable
stock at its true value.

If appellants have no remendy,

they will be forced to helplessly watch the value of their
2 0 year investment dwindle.

Thus, an appropriate remedy in

this situation would be to break up these four corporations,
allow appellants to operate one or more of the corporations
at a profit to protect their interests, and allow the majority
shareholders to operate the remaining companies for whatever
purpose they desire.

In this manner, the interests of both

parties will be satisfied.
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RELIEF TO WHICH APPELLANTS
ARE ENTITLED
As admitted by respondents, no stock has ever been
transferred to Mountain Service pursuant to the agreement of
April 26, 1965.

The court should exercise its power to

reverse the district court and order respondents to comply
with the terms of that contract and further direct the
purchase of such stock as this court, or the district court,
finds was contemplated in the agreement by Mountain Service.
Because of the breach of their duty under the will of
M. S. Wycoff to employ Max Young, this court should reverse
the district court and award Young the actual damages suffered by him.

These damages should be measured by the difference

between his income while an employee of the companies and
his income after his discharge.
Finally, this court should reverse the district court
and, pursuant to 16-10-93 U.C.A. 1953 appoint a liquidating
receiver with authority to collect the assets of the corporations, and, under the direction of the district court,
distribute the assets in cash or in kind as set for in 1610-93.
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CONCLUSION
The manifest injustice imposed upon the appellants by
the continued operation of the Wycoff companies under the
direction of their boards of directors controlled by respondent Zions can only be remedied by the intervention of this
court pursuant to the equitable powers vested in it by the
provisions of 16-10-92 U.C.A. 1953. This provision was
enacted to protect minority shareholders from oppressive
acts of those in control of corporations.

There is no

requirement that it be shown that irreparable injury is
being suffered by the corporation because of the acts of
those in control, but merely that their actions are prejudicial ;to the interests of the minority.

The actions of the

respondents clearly are not directed at obtaining the best
possible profit for the corporations and thus the largest
return to their shareholders.

Rather, the companies are

being operated for the sole and exclusive benefit of the
trusts controlled by Zions First National Bank.

Any income

received by appellants from the corporations is merely an
incidental result of the cash requirements of the trusts—
and such income comes only after the bank has exhausted all
other available avenues of draining funds from the corporations.
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Unless this court intervenes in this situation, the
appellants will never have any voice in the manner in which
the companies are operated.

As such they will have no con-

trol over their most valuable asset, and because of the
closed nature of the corporations they will never be able to
dispose of their stock at any reasonable price.
&L R. MONT MCDOWELL
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